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RIGHTS TALK AND PATIENT SUBJECTIVITY: THE 
ROLE OF AUTONOMY, EQUALITY, AND 
PARTICIPATION NORMS 
Nan D. Hunter* 
[I]llness is not merely a state of the organism and I or 
personality, but comes to be an institutionalized role. 1 
If the government was going to continue to act as if we 
didn't exist, if the medical establishment was prone to gridlock 
over funds, if the drug companies were waiting till the curve got 
high enough for profit, then we would find our own way. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The great majority of individuals have related to the health care 
system primarily as patients. For most of the history of medicine, 
the patient has been the embodiment of a diagnosis, the passive 
target of treatments, the recipient of i:qjections and infusions, and 
the (hoped for) compliant consumer of medications and follower of 
orders. No more. Patients themselves have changed the social 
meaning of "patient" so dramatically that it only thinly resembles its 
meaning of even a generation ago. 
The patient's role today is often that of a partner in managing 
care. The patient can be a co-creator-sometimes more so, 
sometimes less so, but almost always potentially-of the medical 
regimen that she undertakes. And with this increasing autonomy 
comes increasing accountability for prevention, wellness, and 
maintenance, as well as various forms of liability-socially if not 
(yet) legally-if those responsibilities are not fulfilled. 
We also understand the patient today to be a consumer of 
medical services, with a consumer's orientation to questions of price, 
quality, and value. Yet "consumer" both fails to capture what is 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I thank my 
colleague Patricia King and the participants at the Wake Forest Law School 
Symposium on Patient-Centered Health Law and Ethics for their comments. 
1. Talcott Parsons, The Sick Role and the Role of the Physician 
Reconsidered, 53 MILBANK MEMORIAL FuND Q. 257, 261 (1975). 
2. PAUL MONETTE, BORROWED TIME: AN AIDS MEMOIR 103 (1988). 
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unique about the experience of health care and also implicitly cabins 
individual agency and responsibility to market-related interactions. 
In short, the role of the patient has become far more complex 
than it ever has been before. The identity of patient has been de-
and reconstructed into ever thicker formulations. The conceptual 
root of our contemporary understandings of "patient" is an 
assumption of autonomous subjectivity, i.e., of an individual aware 
of and capable of acting on her choices for medical care. The 
Symposium of which this Essay is a part considers the most recent 
stage in this evolution of meanings: the concept of patient-
centeredness, with its implication of provider deference to the 
patient's perspective. 
Throughout this process of an evolving patient identity, law has 
played a central constitutive role. In the 1960s and 1970s, the law 
of informed consent brought the concept of patient autonomy into 
the constellation of metanorms shaping the idealized doctor-patient 
relationship. 3 From that process, the patient as a rights-bearing 
subject emerged. In the 1970s and 1980s, women's health advocates 
and AIDS patients brought a new level of militancy to the patient 
role, undertaking representation on their own behalf and on behalf 
of future patients with the same disease. Their efforts produced 
lasting legal changes in such fundamental medical endeavors as 
clinical research. 4 In the last two decades, the rise of managed care 
and the growing shift of financial burdens and risk onto the patient 
were reflected in the model of patient as consumer, market actor, 
and self-insurer-a change also inscribed by and into law. 5 
Each of these developments carries a distinct political valence 
with differing, even contradictory, implications for legal and political 
frameworks for the health care system. Informed-consent doctrine 
exemplifies liberal rights discourse, disease activism connotes 
organized collective action, and the health-consumer identity has 
facilitated market-oriented health policy. All have become part of 
the experience of seeking health care, and all share one common 
theme: they reflect a shift in the cultural meaning of "patient" from 
a passive figure to that of an agentic actor with multiple dimensions 
of subjectivity. They provide a starting point for understanding just 
who the patient at the center is, what her roles will be in the health 
care system as a whole, and what her reasonable expectations of 
that system will encompass. 
In this Essay, I take patient autonomy as the beginning point, 
the source of much in modern bioethics and the antecedent of the 
concept of patient-centeredness. My project is to enrich the values 
at the core of patient identity, expanding them beyond autonomy 
and beyond the treatment context and the doctor-patient dyad. I 
3. See JESSICA W. BERGET AL., INFORMED CONSENT 21 (2d ed. 2001). 
4. See infra Part II. 
5. See infra Part III. 
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identify three additional dimensions of patient subjectivity that 
must be accounted for if one is to develop a sound conceptualization 
of patient-centeredness. In the process, I argue that the basis for a 
new cultural norm ofbiocitizenship is emerging. ' 
Part I retells the story of informed consent by surfacing the role 
of equality norms. The law related to patient autonomy has 
overlooked the role that the development of equality norms played 
in the realization of concepts such as informed consent, as individual 
and collective concerns about unequal treatment provided greater 
support for the individual's right to decide. In this context, I mean 
for equality to connote equal dignity, rather than the formal equality 
of antidiscrimination doctrine. The law's oversight is largely a 
product of the inadequacy of both antidiscrimination and informed-
consent law to capture the full nature of the harm involved. 
Current trends in informed-consent law are reinforcing the move 
toward more equality in physician-patient status. 
Part II examines the collective dimension of patient 
participation in medical care. Disease-group activism has become 
the most vibrant example of patient involvement in care, one that 
was transformed when people with AIDS began articulating a vision 
of patient empowerment that extended far beyond what were then 
its assumed boundaries. This aggressive claim of a right to 
participation as a group in research, resource allocation, and policy 
decisions has been taken up by other advocates, most prominently 
those involved with breast cancer issues. Although particular 
factors associated with these two diseases suggest that widespread 
migration of a norm of collective participation is unlikely, and there 
are reasons as well to believe that it can be counterproductive in 
certain ways, it nonetheless has become culturally available as a 
model of doctor-patient relations. 
In Part III, I analyze the ways in which the rhetoric of medical 
consumerism interfaces with norms of autonomy, equality, and 
participation. Although much in the language of "consumer-
directed" health policy is driven by the desire to cut costs rather 
than to enhance patient selfhood or the quality of care, the 
promotion of an identity as consumer is a double-edged sword, both 
altering and reinforcing traditional hierarchies of power in the 
health care system. 
Part IV places these strands in the context of biocitizenship 
theory. The three qualities discussed in Parts I through III-
autonomy, equality, and participation-create a conceptual platform 
on which it is possible to imagine building an understanding that 
patients can, at least in some instances, assume the rights and 
responsibilities that we associate with membership in a political 
community. 
To summarize, patient-centeredness could function as simply 
the updated, more user-friendly iteration of the autonomy principle, 
unless autonomy is not only supplanted but expanded in the ways 
1528 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
that I describe. As we apply patient-centeredness to health law, our 
aspiration should be to keep it both as multidimensional as each 
patient actually is and as scalable as our massive health care 
system demands. Recognizing the broader context-with 
acknowledgment of the importance of the values of equality and 
participation-and seeing the possibility of further enhancing the 
individual's role into that of citizen-like engagement will help us 
achieve this goal. 
I. ECHOES OF EQUALITY 
I begin with a normative claim and a working definition. The 
normative claim is that the core of any meaningful idea of patient-
centeredness must be a prioritization of patient dignity. 6 My 
working definition is that patient dignity embodies, at the least, two 
principles: autonomy and equality-that is, that each patient is 
presumed to be equally entitled to the respect due a moral agent, 
and that in the realm of dignity and respect, doctor and patient are 
peers. 7 The role of equality as central to autonomy may seem self-
evident, but it is, at best, underdeveloped in the literature. 
The law protecting patient autonomy is grounded most deeply 
in informed consent. Doctrinally, informed consent is a species of 
tort, and conceptually, it resonates with contractual notions of 
"[s]elf-conscious, rational, functionally-specific agreements between 
independent individuals."8 The normative trump card is the "value-
complex of individualism. "9 
Equality is a much trickier concept; the formal equality 
standard derived from antidiscrimination law once powerfully 
applied to and altered health care institutions, 10 but that is much 
less true today. 11 Moreover, the principle of equal dignity 
6. The Institute of Medicine defines "patient centered" as "providing care 
that is respectful of and responsive to individual patient preferences, needs, and 
values and ensuring that patient values guide all clinical decisions." COMM. ON 
QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: 
A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 40 (2001). 
7. For purposes of this Essay, I wish to simply bracket the cultural 
contingency of meanings of autonomy and to note that my focus is solely on 
American culture and law. 
8. Renee C. Fox, The Evolution of American Bioethics: A Sociological 
Perspective, in SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICAL ETHICS 201, 206 
(George Weisz ed., 1990). 
9. Id. 
10. See DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A 
NATION 32-63, 96-142 (1999). 
11. When the Supreme Court eliminated the possibility of private parties 
bringing disparate impact challenges under Title VI in Alexander v. Sandoval, 
532 U.S. 275 (2001), litigation against health care institutions on the ground of 
race discrimination virtually stopped. See Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, 
Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern Health Care System: Reinvigorating the 
Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 
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encompasses something different from-both more and less than-
the command that likes should be treated alike. I wish to draw out 
the relationship between the concepts of autonomy and equality in 
health care and the central role that equality norms have played 
and continue to play in the construction of patient autonomy and 
informed consent. 
The legal literature on informed consent and the literature on 
rights-oriented social movements are seldom in conversation. 12 Yet 
one could not understand patient rights, patient subjectivity, or 
patient-centeredness without incorporating both autonomy and 
equality rights. This Part of the Essay initiates that process. 13 I 
begin by identifying how the cross-cutting nature of these concerns 
shaped the origins of informed-consent law. I then discuss some of 
the ways that equality concerns continue to influence that body of 
law. 
A. Revisiting Informed Consent 
The patient as rights-bearing subject entered both the law and 
the medical community through the creation of the requirement of 
informed consent. 14 Most histories of the law of informed consent 
attribute its origins to a slow accretion of references in state tort law 
that expanded a physician's duty not to touch patients without their 
consent to include a duty to apprise patients of the risk of a 
procedure. 15 This approach to autonomy draws on its deep moral 
and philosophical roots. 16 
YALE J. HEALTH POL 'y L. & ETHICS 215, 238-45 (2003). 
12. See infra note 24 for some exceptions. 
13. Two caveats: First, I am not making a simple causal argument, i.e., 
that certain social reform movements created informed-consent law (however, I 
am arguing that those movements shaped how and when the doctrine emerged). 
Second, this Essay does not attempt the kind of extensive historical analysis of 
this relationship that, in my view, remains to be done. A full history would 
consider the role of right-to-die campaigns, the disability rights movement, 
groups organized to demand more control over access to unapproved drugs, and 
efforts to secure translation services, among others. 
14. See RUTH FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
INFORMED CONSENT 86-100 (1986). 
15. See BERGET AL., supra note 3, at 4~6; FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra 
note 14, at 119-40; cf. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to 
Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 280-81 (1985) 
(explaining that changing views of professional responsibility increased 
expectations of doctors' affirmative disclosures of medical procedures). The 
term "informed consent" was first used in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. 
University Board of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). 
Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: 
Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REv. 257, 270 n.78 (2005). 
16. See, e.g., Alfred I. Tauber, Historical and Philosophical Reflections on 
Patient Autonomy, 9 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 299, 304-10 (2001); Bruce J. 
Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 
1705, 1707-15 (1992). 
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In their definitive history of informed consent, Professors Ruth 
Faden and Tom Beauchamp describe the key conceptual innovation 
as the law's articulation of an affirmative duty by physicians to 
provide the patient with the "facts which are necessary to form the 
basis of an intelligent consent."17 They mark this as the 
inauguration of the independent importance of the autonomy 
principle, apart from the instrumental value of patient consent as 
an enhancement of old-fashioned patient qbedience. 18 Similarly, 
Jaime King and Benjamin Moulton describe patient autonomy as 
"the most well known principle of medical ethics."19 
Change in medical consent law was indeed evolutionary during 
most ofthe twentieth century. 20 The initial cultural groundwork for 
informed consent was laid by public revulsion against experiments 
conducted by Nazi physicians, and its legal codification derived from 
the Nuremberg Code's prohibition against using human beings as 
research subjects without their consent. 21 The pace of change vastly 
accelerated in the early 1970s, however. 22 This occurred not only 
because of the broader "rights revolution" in American society 
during the same time, but also specifically because of the 
politicization of medicine, along with other institutions. Indeed, it is 
striking how neatly the instantiation of the informed-consent 
requirement fits the model of a cycle-including a burst of rapid, 
dramatic change preceded and followed by more dormant periods-
that often characterizes social-movement change. 23 
The women's and racial justice movements were especially 
17. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 14, at 125; see also Canterbury v. 
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 
1972) (citing Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786). 
18. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 14, at 125. 
19. Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed 
Consent: The Case for Shared Medical Decision·Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 
429, 435 (2006). 
20. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 14, at 119-40. 
21. See 2 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 181 
( 1949), available at http://www .loc.gov/rr/frd/Military _Law/pdf/NT _war 
-criminals_ Vol-II. pdf ("The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely 
essential."); see also FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 14, at 153. 
22. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW 
AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 3 (2003) ("Without 
putting too fine a point on it, the critical period of change was 1966 to 1976."). 
For other important cases in addition to Canterbury and Cobbs decided during 
the 1970s, see Riedesser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d 1052 (Ariz. 1975); Holton v. Pfingst, 
534 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1975); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977); Llera v. 
Wisner 557 P.2d 805 (Mont. 1976); Gerety v. Demers, 589 P.2d 180 (N.M. 1978); 
Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1971); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972); and Scaria 
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 227 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1975). 
23. See John D'Emilio, Cycles of Change, Questions of Strategy: The Gay 
and Lesbian Movement After Fifty Years, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 31, 41-
42 (Craig A. Rimmerman et al. eds., 2000). 
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significant in the move toward recognition of patient-autonomy 
rights. 24 Physician disrespect of patients had long been exacerbated 
by race and gender, and equality movements of the mid-twentieth 
century included these issues as part of their a§"endas. 25 This 
equality-focused "master frame" of social change, 2 and the new 
social meanings that resulted from it, shaped the contours, timing, 
and social meaning of the informed-consent doctrine. 
An example is the role of women's health issues in the 
construction of informed consent. Recent historical research tells us 
that a case that is often cited as a classic of autonomy principles 
because of Justice Cardozo's epigrammatic dictum-"Every human 
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body''27 -could be more properly 
understood as early evidence for the women's health movement. 
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital arose from the 
unauthorized performance of a hysterectomy after the physician 
determined that the patient was "too nervous" for a vaginal 
examination. 28 Observing the etiquette of a hundred years ago, 
Justice Cardozo did not mention these details in his opinion. Mary 
Schloendorff consented to an "ether exam" but not to surgery.29 The 
outcome did not vindicate informed consent, however; the New York 
Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for the hospital on the ground 
of charitable immunity. 30 
Framed as a women's rights case, Schloendorff marks a 
protofeminist departure point for the resistance of women patients 
to a broad range of misogynist practices in later decades. Historian 
David Rothman notes that the women's movement of the 1970s 
24. Dr. Barron Lerner has specifically noted the impact of the women's 
health movement on the development of informed-consent law. See Barron H. 
Lerner, Inventing a Curable Disease: Historical Perspectives on Breast Cancer, 
in BREAST CANCER: SOCIETY SHAPES AN EPIDEMIC 25, 42 (Anne S. Kasper & 
Susan J. Ferguson eds., 2000); cf Patricia A. King, Race, Equity, Health Policy 
and the African American Community, in AFRICAN AMERICAN BIOETHICS 67, 69 
(Lawrence J. Prograis Jr. & Edmund D. Pellegrino eds., 2007) (discussing the 
history of disparity in African-American health care). See generally Patricia A. 
King, Reflections on Race and Bioethics in the United States, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 
149 (2004). 
25. See ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 142-44 (describing how feminist 
movements in the 1960s increased female patient autonomy); SMITH, supra note 
10, at 40-44, 50-57, 76-79, 91-95. 
26. See David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and Cycles of 
Protest, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 133, 138-44 (Aldon D. 
Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992) (explaining "master frames" and 
their relevance to social movements). 
27. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), 
superseded by statute, N.Y. PuBLIC HEALTH LAw§ 2805-d (McKinney 2007). 
28. Paul A. Lombardo, Phantom Tumors and Hysterical Women: Revising 
Our View of the SchloendorffCase, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 791, 795 (2005). 
29. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93. 
30. ld. at 95. 
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found that "the issue of men dominating women was inseparable 
from doctors dominating patients."31 The catalog of deprivations of 
patient autonomy that motivated feminists included Cesarean 
sections for physician convenience and sterilization and mastectomy 
without specific consent. 32 
Informed consent both was and was not a "women's issue." 
There are many post-Schloendorff cases that resonate with heavily 
gendered forms of paternalism and legal arguments. 33 Needless to 
say, what was then the professional norm for beneficence, including 
the failure to tell patients of terminal diagnoses34 or the taking of 
liberties during surgery,35 extended to male patients as well. Yet 
many of the common practices used with women patients reinforced 
a broader set of subordinating practices and thereby triggered an 
explicitly feminist political response. 
Despite this connection, there was no sex discrimination legal 
claim, as such, available. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
covering entities such as hospitals that receive federal funds, does 
not prohibit discrimination based on sex.36 No portion of the Civil 
Rights Act prohibits discrimination in the provision of services by 
private health care providers. And a claim against a public entity 
grounded in the Equal Protection Clause requires a showing of 
intentional discrimination, which can be difficult to prove. 37 
Somewhat independently, abortion was also an important issue 
for both the women's movement and bioethics, and it illustrates the 
speed of change in the doctor-patient relationship during the same 
period. Justice Blackmun insisted that his opinion for the Supreme 
Court in Roe v. Wade did not allow "abortion on demand" because of 
the central role accorded to the physician in decision making. 38 
However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, medical authorities 
31. RoTHMAN, supra note 22, at 142-43. 
32. See Lerner, supra note 24, at 40-42; Marc A Rodwin, Patient 
Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons from Medical Consumerism and the 
Patients' Rights, Women's Health and Disability Rights Movements, 20 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 147, 157-63 (1994); see also Lombardo, supra note 28, at 796-97 
(describing the Schloendorff physician performing a hysterectomy without the 
patient's consent). 
33. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 187, 193 (W.D. La. 1955); 
Carman v. Dippold, 379 N.E.2d 1365, 1370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Charley v. 
Cameron, 528 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Kan. 1974); Henry v. Bronx Lebanon Med. Ctr., 
385 N.Y.S.2d 772, 775 (App. Div. 1976); Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137, 1140-
41 (Pa. 1993); see also Suzanne K. Ketler, Note, The Rebirth of Informed 
Consent: A Cultural Analysis of Informed Consent After Schreiber v. Physicians 
Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.1029, 1039-45 (2001). 
34. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 17-25 (1984). 
35. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). 
37. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1976). 
38. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973); Nan D. Hunter, Justice 
Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of Medical Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 
147, 184-85 (2006). 
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shifted from seeking liberalization of abortion laws to supporting 
repeal of any abortion-specific restrictions. 39 As a result, the effect 
of delegating authority to the treating physician amounted to giving 
the full right to decide to the woman patient. Later, the Court 
recognized protection for autonomy in reproductive choice to be a 
necessary component of women's equality as citizens and references 
to the physician's role as joint decision maker effectively ended. 40 
Alongside change in the law regarding informed consent in 
medical care, the question of informed consent for human research 
subjects was revolutionized when press reports brought public 
attention to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. 41 For the previous forty 
years, many of the almost four hundred African-American men who 
were subjects in a Public Health Service study of the effects of 
syphilis had been denied treatment for the disease, including 
penicillin, which became available roughly midway through the 
study. 42 Although the necessity of informed-consent principles for 
research had already become part of the Nuremberg Code43 and the 
Helsinki Declaration, 44 Tuskegee-with its implication of profoundly 
racist medical decision making-led to a literal rewriting of the law. 
Congressional hearings followed the disclosure in the press, 45 as did 
the National Research Act,46 which created the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research,47 which published the Belmont Report, 46 which 
led to the federal regulation now known as the "Common Rule. "49 
39. See Hunter, supra note 38, at 192-96; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 
179, 197-98 (1973) (striking down a law that allowed abortion only if a 
committee of physicians approved the procedure). 
40. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). 
41. See, e.g., Jean Heller, Syphilis Victims in U.S. Study Went Untreated for 
40 Years, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1972, at Al. 
42. See JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TuSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 
147, 150, 160--64 (1981); SUSAN M. REVERBY, EXAMINING TuSKEGEE: THE 
INFAMOUS SYPHILIS STUDY AND ITS LEGACY 63-64, 89-90 (2009). 
43. NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 21, at 181-82; see also 
REVERBY, supra note 42, at 189. 
44. WORLD MED. Ass'N, WORLD MEDICAL AsSOCIATION DECLARATION OF 
HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN 
SUBJECTS 2-4 (2008), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications 
/10policies/b3/17c.pdf; see also REVERBY, supra note 42, at 189. 
45. See Quality of Health Care-Human Experimentation, 1973: Hearing on 
S. 974, S. 878, and S.J. Res. 71 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. 
on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong. 3-4 (1973); see also REVERBY, supra 
note 42, at 100--03. 
46. National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974). 
47. Id. § 201, 88 Stat. at 348. 
48. Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,192-93, 23,195 (Apr. 18, 
1979). 
49. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.124 (2009); Fazal Khan, The Human Factor: 
Globalizing Ethical Standards in Drug Trials Through Market Exclusion, 57 
DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 887 (2008) ("Pursuant to the National Research Act, [the 
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The Tuskegee Study survivors themselves received 
compensation from the settlement of a class action lawsuit filed on 
their behalf by lawyers 'working with the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund. 50 Ironically, however, this case did not contribute to the 
development of informed-consent doctrine. In part because of the 
participation of the historically black Tuskegee Institute and local 
African-American physicians in the study, the plaintiffs' lawyers 
faced a difficult proof problem in basing the case on a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause. 51 The other major claim-a claim that the 
study failed to obtain informed consent from the participants-was 
complicated by a potential sovereign-immunity defense, which 
plaintiffs sought to avoid by proceeding under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act ("FTCA"), 52 a strategy that made relief contingent on 
whether Alabama state law recognized a cause of action for 
abrogation of informed consent. 53 
The court never reached the merits of the claims, and the 
settlement was probably a relief to plaintiffs' lawyers. 54 The legal 
obstacles they encountered illustrate the misfit in law between the 
principles of equal dignity and the structure of antidiscrimination 
law. In what today would be recognized as an example of the kind of 
doctrinal lacunae identified in intersectionality theory, 55 the law 
simply lacked the conceptual capacity to capture the full nature of 
the harm done to the men in the study. 
The Tuskegee example implicates two forms of compound 
discrimination: 
'[M]ultiple discrimination' can occur in at least two ways: 
where the grounds of discrimination are additive in nature, 
and/or where the discrimination is based on an indivisible 
combination of two or more social characteristics. The former, 
government] instituted regulations governing human research that became 
known as the "Common Rule."). 
50. See Pollard v. United States, 69 F.R.D. 646, 647-49 (M.D. Ala. 1976); 
Larry I. Palmer, Paying for Suffering: The Problem of Human Experimentation, 
56 Mo. 1. REV. 604, 608-10 (1997). 
51. See FRED D. GRAY, THE TuSKEGEE SYPmLIS STUDY 84-90 (1998). 
Professor Palmer argues that Attorney Fred Gray's decision to build the case 
around a theory of racial selection was "unwise" because it ignored the 
complexities of who was involved. See Palmer, supra note 50, at 610. 
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006). 
53. Under the FTCA, an individual can obtain damages from the 
government upon showing governmental action resulting in what amounts to a 
personal injury in the law of the state where the injury occurred. Id. 
§ 1346(b)(1). 
54. Fred Gray, plaintiffs' lead counsel, had hoped to avoid litigation 
altogether by obtaining financial relief for his clients after the congressional 
hearings, but those efforts failed. See REVERBY, supra note 42, at 101-03. 
55. See Sarah Hannett, Equality at the Intersections: The Legislative and 
Judicial Failure To Tackle Multiple Discrimination, 23 O.J.L.S. 65, 68 (2003) 
(Eng). 
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'additive discrimination', describes a situation where an 
individual 'belongs to two different groups, both of which are 
affected by [discriminatory] practices.' The latter, commonly 
referred to as 'intersectional discrimination,' 'arises out of the 
combination of various oppressions which, together, produce 
something unique and distinct from any one form of 
discrimination standing alone.'56 
The men in the Tuskegee Study were certainly victims of the former 
and perhaps also of the latter. 
Research practices in the 1940s, when the study began, were 
such that particular forms of oppression were directed toward black 
research subjects, thus arguably constituting that as a specific 
identity. The Tuskegee Study was extreme but not aberrational. 
Professor Smith quotes a New York surgeon in 1926 as saying, 
"[T]he Negro has always been appropriated as choice 'clinical 
material' by the medical profession. In the eyes of racists in that 
profession, the Negro was always next in line beyond the 
experimental animal."57 The men in the Tuskegee Study were 
victimized both because of their race and their status as research 
subjects, but neither ground alone provided a strong legal basis for 
recovery. Neither antidiscrimination nor tort law was adequate to 
address the extent to which dual subordinating discourses had 
deepened the harm to plaintiffs. 
In neither of these examples-the Tuskegee Study nor the 
women's health movement-can one assume that abstract principles 
of informed consent or equality, without more, would have offered 
adequate remedies. One might question, for example, how 
genuinely autonomous any decisions made by low-income Mrican-
Americans in Alabama in the 1940s could have been. Even the 
strongest informed-consent protocols were not likely to have had 
much impact in that context. 
Yet the dominant lesson that emerges from efforts to eliminate 
subordinating practices based on race and sex remains that of the 
mutually reinforcing and constitutive nature of the relationship 
between equality and autonomy norms. Over time, arguments for 
one value have strengthened claims for the other. 
B. The Micropolitics of Medicine 
Doctors' offices and hospitals are highly politicized sites of 
interaction, in which both the intrastaff work culture and the 
provider-patient treatment culture produce and enforce a broad 
range of norms. Clinical medicine is a venue rife with power 
relations. In this context, where information parity between doctor 
and patient exists only rarely, the concept of informed consent has 
56. I d. at 65, 68 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
57. SMITH, supra note 10, at 24. 
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allowed development of a medical practice norm in which treatment 
is a team effort joined by physicians, staff, and patient working as 
partners, each with differing roles. 
In effect, informed-consent doctrine has created a legal platform 
upon which a partial equalization between doctor and patient can be 
built into the culture of medical practice. Depending on their level 
of psychological and physical strength, many patients continue to 
seek doctors to whom they can entrust decision-making authority. 
But most patients no longer approach physicians with the "abject 
dependence"58 formerly characterized as typical. 
This is not to claim that the informed-consent process is a 
smoothly functioning means of patient empowerment, or that the 
answer is a simple response of "the more informed consent, the 
better." Empirical studies have found that both doctor and patient 
are often unsatisfied with current informed-consent standards, 
sometimes for conflicting reasons. 59 Both frequently resist 
wholehearted reliance on patient decision-making,60 while at the 
same time patients are also dissatisfied with insufficient levels of 
participation in decision making. 61 Physicians routinely truncate 
the process, now referred to as "consenting the patient." Looking 
toward the future, the economics of medical practice seem 
increasingly likely to impede the expansion of the informed-consent 
process as an ingredient in doctor-patient interaction. 62 Its utility as 
a remedy is questionable because of the difficulty of proving 
causation and damages. 63 
Yet, despite the gap between informed-consent law as it exists 
on the books and as it occurs in medical practice on the ground, the 
ideal of patient autonomy retains its power to shape norms and 
social understandings. 64 Informed consent has become engrained in 
58. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10 (Cal. 1972). 
59. See Peter Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 
932-35 (1994) (discussing various studies). 
60. See CARL SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 40--46 (1998); Cathy 
J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward 
a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379, 397-427 (1990); 
King & Moulton, supra note 19, at 446-48, 461-62. See generally Clarence H. 
Braddock et al., Decision Making in Outpatient Practice: Time To Get Back to 
Basics, 282 JAMA 2313 (1999); Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a 
Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL 'y 69 (1993). 
61. See King & Moulton, supra note 19, at 468-73. 
62. Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of 
Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 292-305 (1999). To some 
extent, this problem may be alleviated through the use of videos and other 
"decision aids." See King & Moulton, supra note 19, at 488-90. 
63. See generally Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision 
Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. 
REv. 607 (proposing a shift from focusing on proximate cause to identifYing and 
valuing the patient's decision rights, which, the authors argue, doctors destroy 
by withholding information). 
64. Faden and Beauchamp describe the mixed impact of informed consent 
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rights talk for patients generally and in various versions of a 
"patient bill of rights."65 Moreover, patients are pushing the 
boundaries of informed consent, albeit with limited success. 
Patients are using informed-consent arguments to seek information 
about the physician as well as about the nature of the proposed 
treatment. The new topics to which courts have, to varying degrees, 
applied informed-consent principles are provider experience, 
provider health status, and financial incentives. 
Two state supreme courts have ruled that an informed-consent 
claim may lie depending on the circumstances and degree of 
falsification if a physician misrepresents her experience or 
credentials. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that a physician 
was liable under an informed-consent theory for misleading the 
patient about how many times he had performed the surgery in 
question, which was a difficult neurological procedure, and for 
failing to disclose the comparative risks between having the surgery 
and not having it. 66 The New Jersey Supreme Court followed 
Wisconsin in holding: 
[l]f an objectively reasonable person could find that physician 
experience was material in determining the medical risk of 
the ... procedure to which plaintiff consented, and if a 
reasonably prudent person in plaintiffs position informed of 
the defendant's misrepresentations about his experience would 
not have consented, then a claim based on lack of informed 
b . . d 67 consent may e ma1nta1ne . 
However, as the New Jersey court pointed out, generally courts have 
held that physicians do not have an affirmative duty to disclose 
information regarding their experience or training. 66 
Courts have also diverged in how they have handled claims that 
a patient had a right to be notified of other physician characteristics, 
such as a history of substance abuse or a diagnosis of a 
communicable disease such as AIDS or HIV. Several courts have 
expressed fear of a slippery slope of possible required disclosures 
that extend too far to be justified by public policy, or have deferred 
on medical practice as follows: "At the same time that nothing has changed in 
medicine, everything has changed." FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 14, at 
100. 
65. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The 
Fiduciary Obligation of Physicians To "Just Say No" if an "Informed" Patient 
Demands Services that Are Not Medically Indicated, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 
361 & n.145, 362 (2009). 
66. Adler ex rel. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 510 (Wis. 1996); see 
also Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed 
Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1999) 
(discussing Johnson, 545 N.W.2d 495). 
67. Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 84 (N.J. 
2002). 
68. Id. at 82-83. 
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to professional organizations to impose discipline in situations of 
physician substance abuse. 69 Other courts, however, have found a 
cause of action. 70 
Acceptance of the individual's right to know how her health 
plan structures financial incentives that might influence a 
provider's recommendations related to treatment has produced 
federal 71 and state72 disclosure requirements. 
These new directions in informed-consent law are not about who 
will make the final decision regarding a course of treatment or even 
about bargaining power between doctor and patient. If patients are 
sufficiently annoyed by a paternalistic or uncommunicative doctor, 
most can switch physicians, at least for outpatient care. Although 
the doctrinal function of informed consent is to guarantee that a 
patient is told of all material risks associated with a course of 
treatment so that she can intelligently decide whether to proceed, 
the actual function of the doctrine on the ground may do more to 
shape patient expectations about communication than about 
decision making per se. 
One major rationale for informed consent is to diminish the 
information asymmetry between professional and layperson. 73 It is 
also true, however, that information disclosure about the 
physician-and not merely about the statistical risk associated with 
a given procedure-functions as a partial equalizer of doctor and 
patient. Traditionally, the patient's role has been to furnish a 
detailed medical history while often knowing no more about a 
physician than her practice areas and what can be gleaned from 
diplomas on the wall. Asserting a claim to know more signifies an 
unwillingness to accept the traditional hierarchy, as well as a desire 
for self-determination. 
C. Summary 
The ostensible purpose of the informed-consent requirement is 
69. See, e.g., Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 787 
(Ga. 2000) (alleged cocaine use); K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 559-60 
(Minn. 1995) (HIV/AIDS); Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213, 216-17 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1991) (alleged alcohol abuse). 
70. See, e.g., Ridding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1198 (La. Ct. App. 1991) 
(alleged alcohol abuse); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 339 (Md. 1993) 
(HIV/AIDS). 
71. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 197 4, Pub. L. 
No. 93-406, §§ 404, 502, 88 Stat. 829, 877, 891 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1132 (2006)). The disclosure duty is on the health-plan 
provider, not the medical provider. See Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage, 
Disclosing Physician Financial Incentives, 281 JAMA 1424, 1427 (1999). 
72. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1076(i)(6) (2010); R.I. GEN. LAws 
§ 23-17.13-2(b)(8)-(10) (2008); see also Krause, supra note 62, at 375-85 
(discussing state statutes' disclosure requirements); Miller & Sage, supra note 
71, at 1427, 1430 & n.33. 
73. See Schuck, supra note 59, at 957-58. 
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to provide the patient with a form of the right to exit, i.e., a right to 
determine whether to proceed with treatment that the doctor 
recommends. I suggest that one reason its vitality as an ideal 
continues, however, is that, although its utility in securing the right 
to exit may be more aspirational than real, because patients often 
rely on physicians for the expertise that determines their decisions, 
it does enable at least some patients to rebalance the doctor-patient 
power dynamic in communication. In other words, its primary 
function is less about exit than about voice, and specifically about a 
more dialogic, mutually respectful voice. This inflection in the social 
meaning of informed consent grew from the impact on its 
development of the women's health movement and the civil-rights 
movement. 
It is not difficult to understand why the equality dimension of 
informed consent has been understated in legal scholarship. The 
primacy of individualism in health law is overdetermined by the 
prevailing values in American culture, the individualist norms of 
bioethics, and the structure of medical practice. In addition, the 
concept of equality is difficult to define in health care; the standard 
antidiscrimination approach offers little assistance. And, at least in 
terms of the doctor-patient dyad, equality in every respect is not 
even desirable: patients want there to be some information 
asymmetry between themselves and their care providers. 
Yet the invisibility of equality norms in this context is 
unfortunate. An increasing number of patients-either individually 
or, as I will address in the next Part, collectively-approach health 
care with at least the hope of a collaborative relationship with their 
provider. As the financial consequences of both treatment and 
health status increasingly shift to patients, the trend toward more 
active patient involvement in such care is only likely to gather 
steam. In this situation, the technical concept of consent as the 
assumption of known risk is a desiccated understanding of equal 
dignity and, therefore, of patient-centeredness. 
II. PATIENT ACTIVISM 
One of the most profound changes in the role of patients has 
been the emergence of group-identity movements based on specific 
diseases. Disease-based advocacy groups have operated in the 
United States since early in the twentieth century, initially with the 
goals of informing the public and the medical profession about the 
particular disease and seeking additional funding for research. 74 
74. Even early public education campaigns could be militant, however. In 
1936, the American Cancer Society launched a volunteer effort known as the 
Women's Field Army, complete with khaki uniforms and the insignia of rank. 
Women's Field Army members solicited funds and sponsored events that 
greatly increased popular knowledge of cancer. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE 
DREAD DISEASE 71-73, 121-24 (1987). 
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But the response to HIV/AIDS redrew the boundaries of possibility 
for health care related activism. The social-movement model that 
AIDS activists created became the new template for disease-based 
advocacy, such that within a decade after the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
began, a rising generation of breast cancer advocates self-
consciously adopted and adapted it. In this Part, I analyze these 
two movements and the role of law in shaping how activism 
influences individual patient subjectivity. 
AIDS activism and breast cancer activism share three 
important characteristics that are not accounted for in either the 
autonomy or the civil-rights literature. First, the identity 
implicated in each movement is two-dimensional, in that it is both 
specific to a disease and heavily associated with another stigmatized 
characteristic. Thus, both were able to build on the organizational 
and other resources already developed by a closely related identity-
politics movement. Second, legislation enacting formal equality 
protections for the group was not the primary focus of either group's 
campaign, although both sought change that was heavily predicated 
on equality norms. Thus their agendas differed from those of 
traditional civil-rights organizations. Third, both movements 
instead prioritized the appropriation of additional funds to combat 
the disease with which they were concerned, and the adoption of 
mechanisms guaranteeing participation by group representatives in 
decision making concerning research and other scientific questions. 
Most important, both movements altered the protocols for the 
governance of scientific and medical institutions, a major step 
beyond the traditional role of patients. 
A. HIV I AIDS Activism 
Militant engagement by AIDS patients began in 1983, when a 
conference of PW As (persons with AIDS-the very term "patient" 
sounded too dependent) met in Denver. 75 One of their first acts was 
to adopt the Denver Principles ("Principles"), which both reaffirmed 
patient autonomy and powerfully raised the ante. 76 The Principles 
recognized the rights of PW As to receive "full explanations of all 
medical procedures and risks, to choose or refuse their treatment 
modalities, to refuse to participate in research without jeopardizing 
their treatment and to make informed decisions about their lives."" 
By the late 1980s, the center of AIDS activism was the New 
York City organization ACT-UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash 
75. William B. Rubenstein, Law and Empowerment: The Idea of Order in 
the Time of AIDS, 98 YALE L.J. 975, 990-91 (1989); Michael Callan & Dan 
Turner, A History of the People With AIDS Self-Empowerment Movement, THE 
BODY (Dec. 1997), http://www.thebody.com/contentlart31074.html. 
76. See Rubenstein, supra note 75, at 990. 
77. ld. at 991; see also Callan & Turner, supra note 75. 
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Power). 78 ACT-UP, composed primarily of gay men, who then 
constituted the overwhelming majority of AIDS patients, 79 led an 
extraordinarily successful strategy that changed the terms of 
clinical trial enrollment, research design, and pharmaceutical 
approval processes. ACT-UP's modus operandi was a combination of 
"street theater and intimidation on the one hand, [and] detailed 
position papers and painstaking negotiation on the other."80 
Although part of the response to AIDS stigma included efforts to 
enact antidiscrimination and privacy laws, those issues were never 
the primary focuses for ACT-UP. Instead, driven by the urgency of 
a fatal disease with no cure and initially no treatment, activists left 
civil-rights issues to established public-interest law organizations 
and concentrated their demands on securing access to possible 
medications and on obtaining larger appropriations for research, 
treatment, and prevention. 81 
They succeeded repeatedly. In 1987, ACT-UP protested limited 
enrollment in clinical trials for AZT (zidovudine) and the lengthy 
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") process for allowing drugs 
onto the market. 82 As a direct result, unapproved drugs were made 
available under a "compassionate use" program, and the FDA 
revamped its formal approval process. 83 Similar protests led to 
community-based clinical trials and the growth of "buyers' clubs" 
that purchased pharmaceuticals from outside the United States. 84 
Other accomplishments included enactment of the nation's first 
disease-specific funding law, the Ryan White CARE Act. 85 
Sociologist Steven Epstein argues that the legacy of AIDS 
activism is a new kind of patient identity in at least two respects. 
First, he asserts that "it has rapidly become something of a cliche to 
say that the doctor-patient relationship will never be the same in 
the wake of AIDS."86 Acknowledging that alterations in the 
paternalism-dependency dynamic had already begun, Epstein 
contends that "the significant effect of AIDS ... is that a more 
cooperative model has become normative (at least in medical 
78. See Rubenstein, supra note 75, at 993-94. 
79. See PATRICIA D. SIPLON, AIDS AND THE POLICY STRUGGLE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 4--5 (2002). 
80. Robert M. Wachter, AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Health, 326 
NEW ENG. J. MEn. 128, 128 (1992). 
81. Id. 
82. STEVEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS OF 
KNOWLEDGE 213-14, 222-26 (1996). 
83. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Public's Right to Health: When 
Patient Rights Threaten the Commons, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1335, 1355-56 
(2009); Kent A. Sepkowitz, AIDS-The First 20 Years, 344 NEW ENG. J. MEn. 
1764, 1770 (2001). 
84. See SIPLON, supra note 79, at 26--32. 
85. See id. at 93-102. 
86. EPSTEIN, supra note 82, at 346. 
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rhetoric)."87 However, it hardly needs stating that it is difficult to 
imagine that the conduct of these physicians, or the application of 
this norm, was the same for low-income or minority HIV/AIDS 
patients as it was for the primarily middle-class white men who 
dominated ACT-UP. It is more likely that the doctor-patient 
relationship will never be the same for some patients, but will 
change much less for others. 
In perhaps a more justifiable claim, Epstein argues that AIDS 
advocacy produced a new conception of scientific knowledge. 88 Some 
ACT-UP members developed an extraordinarily sophisticated grasp 
of technical knowledge, enabling them to hold their own in debates 
with scientists over such rarefied subjects as identification of 
surrogate markers of the disease. 89 Even more challenging to the 
scientific establishment, ACT-UP also contended that patients 
brought new and different kinds of knowledge that should be 
considered necessary for excellence in medical research. 90 AIDS 
catalyzed what became the first movement to self-consciously 
transform patients into "activist-experts."91 
B. Breast Cancer Activism 
The women who took up breast cancer patient advocacy in the 
1980s and 1990s continued feminist health political work from the 
1970s and added to it the tactics of AIDS activism. 92 
Like the 1970s women's groups, the breast cancer movement 
rejected medical paternalism in treatment norms. Echoing ACT-UP, 
organizers also sought to refashion research. The movement 
directed its primary demands toward the goals of access to new 
drugs, changing inclusion criteria for clinical trials, and setting new 
directions for funding and priorities in medical research. 93 
Unlike those in the movement related to HIV/AIDS, advocates 
for breast cancer patients were dealing with a disease that was 
neither new nor communicable. As a result, research efforts were 
more standardized and not susceptible to the lurching, frenzied 
changes that occurred as scientists desperately pursued more 
information about AIDS and the causative virus. Moreover, the 
stigma associated with breast cancer was far less intense than the 
stigma associated with AIDS, if only because the disease was much 
less threatening to those who did not have it. Thus in many ways, 
the breast cancer campaign provided a test, under more normal 
87. ld. 
88. ld. at 8-9, 229. 
89. ld. at 8-9. 
90. Id. 
91. ld. at 8. 
92. CAROL S. WEISMAN, WOMEN'S HEALTH CARE: ACTMST TRADITIONS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 207 (1998). 
93. See REBECCA DRESSER, WHEN SCIENCE OFFERS SALVATION 165-67 (2001). 
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circumstances, of the validity of the HIV/AIDS model for a social 
movement related to health care. 
Much of the "law" generated by breast-cancer patient advocacy, 
like much of what ACT-UP generated, consisted of appropriations 
and funding legislation. 94 However, the cancer-patient advocates 
took the AIDS strategy one step further and more firmly 
institutionalized its successes in achieving a place for patients 
inside the major research institutions. The breakthrough came in 
two budget allocations in the mid-1990s. 95 Congress appropriated 
ten million dollars to implement the Clinton administration's 
National Action Plan on Breast Cancer in legislation that included a 
provision that allowed patient advocates to participate in the review 
committees for research grant making. 96 Soon after, advocates 
obtained an equivalent provision in legislation that established 
breast cancer research in the Department of Defense ("DoD"), a 
location that insulated it from cuts in domestic funding that 
customarily exempted DoD. 97 The National Breast Cancer Coalition 
then established its own training programs to prepare lay advocates 
to be able to engage effectively with the physicians and scientists 
with whom they would interact in the grant application review 
98 process. 
C. Limiting Factors 
The kind of mobilization that HIV/AIDS and breast cancer 
patients organized is still ad hoc and rare. It requires, at a 
minimum, sufficient material resources and physical ability for 
extended engagement, in addition to a shared sense of urgency. And 
although both groups made efforts to encourage more democratic 
levels of participation among their constituencies, the socioeconomic 
status of the most active participants was middle class or higher, a 
status that was atypical of the group as a whole. 99 The same 
provisos would apply to earlier women's movement activism that 
insisted on more egalitarian treatment of patients by physicians and 
that developed alternative or self-help health centers. 100 
What Rebecca Dresser has called the "patient-centered 
94. Carol S. Weisman, Breast Cancer Policymaking, in BREAST CANCER: 
SOCIETY SHAPES AN EPIDEMIC, supra note 24, at 213, 220-22. 
95. See WEISMAN, supra note 92, at 207-08. 
96. Id.; Jane Erikson, Breast Cancer Activists Seek Voice in Research 
Decisions, 269 SCIENCE 1508, 1509 (1995). 
97. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 102-396, 
106 Stat. 1876 (1993); WEISMAN, supra note 92, at 208; Erikson, supra note 96, 
at 1508. 
98. WEISMAN, supra note 92, at 208; Erikson, supra note 96, at 1508--09. 
99. See DRESSER, supra note 93, at 166-67; SIPLON, supra note 79, at 5-6; 
Constance A. Nathanson, A Skeptic's Guide to a Movement for Universal Health 
Insurance, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL 'y & L. 443, 450 (2003). 
100. See WEISMAN, supra note 92, at 73. 
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approach to study design and evaluation"101 is here to stay, but it 
comes with significant shortcomings. In addition to the 
unrepresentative composition of patient-advocacy groups, the 
enhanced participation of disease-specific groups in medicine can 
create new problems, even for advocates of greater autonomy, 
equality, and participation. 
For example, even the most truncated version of modern 
informed consent is imperiled by advocate-driven misinformation-
usually excessively high expectations-about the benefits of clinical 
trials. 102 The experience associated with high-dose chemotherapy 
with autologous bone marrow transplants ("ABMT") illustrates the 
point. Many patients initially demanded access to ABMT, with 
significant success, which delayed the completion of clinical trials-
that in the end found that it was not a useful treatment. 103 Another 
form of misinformation was the widespread and incorrect belief 
associated with the breast cancer movement that the risk of that 
disease to women's health was substantially greater than statistics 
indicated. 104 
The paradox for equality is that the greater the success of some 
disease-advocacy organizations, the greater the likelihood that social 
inequality will be exacerbated rather than mitigated because of the 
skewed composition of those groups. 105 Moreover, research on 
diseases that for whatever reason are not represented by active 
lobbyists may be underfunded, even if they result in greater 
mortality and morbidity. 106 And a simple interest-group advocacy 
model is completely unequipped to address more nuanced issues of 
distributive justice, such as trade-offs in resource allocation between 
patients most likely to benefit versus those who are worst off. 107 
Lastly, although norms favoring expanded participation would 
seem the least likely to be undercut by the success of disease-specific 
advocacy groups, even here the incorporation of patients into 
policymaking entities is not without cost. Questions arise about the 
quality and legitimacy of the patient representatives. 108 
lntracommunity disputes, such as the debate among AIDS 
101. DRESSER, supra note 93, at 153. 
102. Id. at 58-59. 
103. Id. at 61-62. 
104. Weisman, supra note 94, at 236. 
105. For example, Professor Renee Landers has argued that reducing 
information asymmetry between patients and physicians may increase the gap 
in the capacity for informed consent between patients who are best situated by 
education and other skills to use the information, and patients who lack those 
resources. See Renee M. Landers, Massachusetts Health Insurance Reform 
Legislation: An Effective Tool for Addressing Racial and Ethnic Disparities in 
Health Care?, 29 IIAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL 'y 1, 57 (2007). 
106. See DRESSER, supra note 93, at 83-84. 
107. See id. at 80-83. 
108. Id. at 10--11, 35-39. 
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advocates over how funds should be allocated between research and 
treatment, can further jeopardize the process. 109 
On balance, however, these are problems produced by the 
achievements of movements that have called into question what 
once was understood as a natural and inevitable characteristic of 
how patients experience the health care system: as individuals 
disconnected from each other and lacking any sense of group 
identity. A patient-centered perspective on care must take account 
of this change and incorporate the possibility of patient-group 
identity, as well as individual values. 
Ill. BUYING POWER 
The last major component of patient identity that I will address 
is that of "consumer." However distressing it is to ethicists, the 
American health care system "is being actively reshaped by the 
expectations of consumers"110 and "consumer-centric financial 
incentives."m I will not repeat here the catalog of differences 
between the role of patient and the role of consumer. 112 Regardless 
of whether medical consumerism is primarily good or bad (for 
whom? for what end?), the important point about such consumerism 
for purposes of this Essay is how it aligns with other aspects of the 
evolution in patient self-understanding. 
Medical consumerism itself is most often discussed in one of two 
ways: either as a watered-down version of patient activism, 
characterized by the ability of individuals to self-educate largely via 
the web; 113 or as a mechanism to contain health care costs by 
enticing patients into plans that shift to them more of the expenses 
of treatment. 114 
As to the former, David Rothman has described consumerism 
enabled by the availability of information as the "second stage in the 
patient autonomy movement."115 He argues that the driving force is 
109. See SIPLON, supra note 79, at 93. 
110. Kenneth W. Kizer, Establishing Health Care Performance Standards in 
an Era of Consumerism, 286 JAMA 1213, 1213 (2001). 
111. James C. Robinson, Managed Consumerism in Health Care, 24 HEALTH 
.AFF. 1478, 1479 (2005). 
112. See, e.g., GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 3-5, 16-19 (3d ed. 
2004); Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? 
Problems with Theory and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. 
REV. 485, 491-95 (2004). 
113. See David J. Rothman, The Origins and Consequences of Patient 
Autonomy: A 25-Year Retrospective, 9 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 255, 259-60 
(2001). 
114. For an example, see the euphemistic description offered by Aetna. 
Consumerism in Health Care, AETNA, http://www.aetna.com/aboutlaoti/aetna 
_perspective/consumerism_healthcare.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2010) 
("Consumerism in health care is based on the idea that individuals should have 
greater control over decisions affecting their health care."). 
115. Rothman, supra note 113, at 259. 
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not a sense of rights, but the diffusion of technology: "[T]he balance 
of power in the examining room has shifted in the 1990s not so 
much because oflawyers, but because ofweb masters."116 
The latter form of consumerism is exemplified by the rhetoric 
used by various industries to advertise products or by insurers 
promoting "consumer-directed health care" plans that shift greater 
financial risk to patients. 117 For example, a firm that offers 
management consulting services declared on its website that: 
In 2008, the U.S. health care system was and continues to be 
in the midst of a transformational change that many believe is 
centered on consumerism-the process of enabling and 
engaging consumers more directly in selection and purchase 
decisions regarding health care services. A traditionally one-
way conversation is becoming a dialogue as the health care 
system transitions from patient-oriented to consumer-
oriented.118 
Similarly, pharmaceutical companies argue that direct-to-consumer 
advertising empowers patients with information and promotes 
"participatory health care."119 
The appropriation of empowerment language in such 
statements-framed in terms of "decisions," "dialogue," and 
"participation" -illustrates how market discourse can depoliticize 
the idea of rights. At the same time, however, seeking to encourage 
a consumer perspective for the patient also creates a paradox: the 
effort both reduces and reinforces the idea of patient empowerment. 
In many respects, the reframing of patient as consumer re-
inscribes a hierarchy of subordinating structures along new lines, 
with patients gaining fool's gold; physicians losing power; and 
greater control flowing, directly or indirectly, to payors and 
marketers. Treating the patient as consumer also reflects a 
commodification of the ethos underlying informed consent. On this 
understanding, information and choice are simply component parts 
of the service or product being provided. 
On the other hand, while understanding oneself as a medical 
consumer may not enhance one's actual power or capacity for self-
determination, the rhetorical structure used to advance this idea is 
consistent with norms of autonomy and participation. This 
superficial meaning accounts for the considerable popular appeal of 
the consumer identity. 
In sum, medical consumerism can be a quasi-bait-and-switch 
116. Id. at 260. 
117. See, e.g., Consumerism in Health Care, supra note 114. 
118. Health Care Consumerism: 2008 Findings, DELOI'ITE, 
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Insights/centers/center-for-health 
-solutions/6ca7f42c8d1fb110V gn VCM100000ba42fOOaRCRD.htm (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2010). 
119. Rothman, supra note 113, at 261. 
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technique in which the promotion of certain products or services 
highlights patient decision making, while the concomitant 
heightened financial responsibility for these choices is occluded. 
Lurking in the background is the serious ethical question about 
whether it is ever legitimate to force individuals with serious 
medical conditions to take on such responsibility. 
A more defensible byproduct of the way that consumer talk is 
used to backburner rights talk is that it reinforces the separate 
norm of accountability. Individual accountability in the realm of 
health care is a controversial principle, because it too can be 
directed to the goal of cost cutting without regard to improving the 
quality of care. Yet there are undeniably some contexts in which the 
individual patient's assumption of responsibility for aspects of her 
own health is beneficial to her, as well as to others. Accountability 
has always been the flip side of the autonomy coin in moral 
philosophy. 120 Increasingly, accountability is yet another dimension 
that is reshaping how individuals experience the role and identity of 
patient. 
IV. THE FOUNDATION FOR BIOCITIZENSHIP 
Citizenship has become a kind of multitasking paradigm, 
invoked to signify much more than an individual's legal membership 
in a sovereign state. Legal scholarship routinely uses citizenship as 
a metaphor, analyzing how individuals understand themselves to be 
"citizens" in relation to their families, workplaces, and ethnic 
affinity groups, 121 as well as virtual citizens of more than one nation-
state. 122 In its broader sociological sense, citizenship denotes roles 
and identities as well as rights and obligations. It creates a subject 
position not only as to nation-states, but also as to a range of much 
broader systems and discourses. 
Especially given this proliferation of citizenship talk, it is 
notable that the intellectual history of any concept of health care 
citizenship is sparse, all the more so as it applies to a nation like the 
United States with largely private sector medical care. The classic 
formulation of a health-related concept of citizenship is T.H. 
Marshall's work. Marshall analyzed citizenship as a compound of 
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Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. REV. 
1161 (2008). 
122. See generally Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of 
Citizenship in an Emigration Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11 (2006); Peter J. 
Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411 
(1997); Alejandro Portes, Global Villagers; The Rise of Transnational 
Communities, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 1996, at 77. 
1548 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
rights existing in three domains: legal or civil, political, and social. 123 
Marshall's legal or civil element referred to a citizen's right to 
freedom from oppression, or autonomy. 124 The political domain of 
citizenship spoke to a right of participation in public decision 
making. 125 His concept of social citizenship referred to citizens as 
beneficiaries of public goods and resources. 126 Writing in Britain 
after World War II, Marshall equated health citizenship with the 
entitlement to medical care, placing it in the third social domain. 127 
The term "biocitizenship" is an invention of political rather than 
legal theory, intended to mark the process by which individuals and 
the state contest power relations as to matters of health and illness. 
It does not refer to any form of literal citizenship. 128 Rather, it 
connotes a relationship between the individual and the health care 
system that has been more central to the interpreters of 
Foucauldian concepts of biopower than to more traditional political 
philosophers. 129 British political sociologist Nikolas Rose, for 
example, proffers a concept of "biological citizenship" that is both 
historical and contemporary. 130 Rose argues that concepts such as 
race, blood lines, and eugenics have long been associated with the 
framing of national citizenship, but that today new kinds of 
biological citizens are forming around genetic and somatic notions of 
both individuality and collectivity. 131 
My focus in this Essay has been on the normative values that 
lie at the heart of patient-centeredness: autonomy, equality, 
participation, and accountability. These are also characteristics 
that we associate with participation in a political system. 
Contemporary patients, like citizens, are agentic actors, even as 
123. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in CONTEMPORARY 
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they are simultaneously the subjects of medical or governance 
practices. 
Patients are increasingly engaging in decision making, the 
formulation and pressing of equality demands, consideration of 
resource allocation, and responding to "patriotic" calls to assume 
greater responsibility for their own health. By these very activities, 
they are being (re)constituted yet again, this time as virtual citizens 
in a metaphorical polity of health care. 
CONCLUSION 
In filling out the contours of patient-centered medicine, scholars 
and policy makers should begin by examining how patients have in 
fact acted to reconfigure their own experience of the health care 
system. As patient subjectivity has expanded to encompass the 
assumption of rights and responsibilities and as norms of autonomy, 
equality, participation, and accountability have become more 
embedded as components of the identity of "patient," the idea of 
citizen-like engagement with the health care system becomes 
increasingly plausible. The move toward a model of care based on 
patient-centeredness will only further strengthen this development. 
